Secure smartphone, untraceable?

[maxmoney]

Btw, with all of your tails setups etc, it may be surprising how they actually track you. For example, your style of writing, your interests that you may reveal here etc. Its all quite the things you don't pay attention to. For example, I see you have a habit of CAPITALIZING your words to emphasize them. Or how you use the word "Comrade". This would be something that one would use to narrow down "suspects". The FBI caught a darkweb forum admin in this way. They found him because he used the word "hiya". He forgot to lock his laptop for a minute and the FBI had all their hands on it.

It's actually quite different from what we're discussing, namely the need for a secure and private way of communicating.

However, once you change, or loose, your physcial phone, how are you going to login back to your Signal account on a new phone (device)? You may no longer have your original sim card to enter OTP that would be sent to it. Or it may be long expired and hence non active. Or it may not work in your current country.

Creating a new Signal account and forgetting about the old one shouldn't be difficult. It's a straightforward process to ensure secure and private communication.

 

[Jerry1911]

So much for encryption

 

[koohl]

No smartphone or smart car i.e. Tesla or other modern car will be safe. Total control to the governments.

 

[0xDEADBEEF]

Here are my two cents on the matter:

The first step is to understand the specific threats you or an organization might face. This means conducting a thorough risk assessment to identify potential vulnerabilities. Even if you're up against an adversary with significant resources and determination, there are defensive measures you can take and products you can use. But since these adversaries are quite determined, the best outcome is being able to detect what they are trying to do and prevent them from taking over fully.

Also remember that your smartphone is just a piece of a larger security strategy. From my observations with clients, there is also the 'danger' of overestimating threats. For instance, an expensive office camera system might seem wise, but if the risk is low, the cost may not be worth it. The goal is to balance the threat level with the practicality and cost of security measures. Which boils down to identifying the outcome you're most concerned about.

 

[koohl]

I think you're overanalyzing the topic a bit and not really understanding why people want certain phone calls and SMS messages to remain between them and the counterparty and not be intercepted by various authorities and other curious individuals.

 

[0xDEADBEEF]

I appreciate your perspective and the emphasis on privacy However, my point centers on the practicality and realism of securing communications. While the pursuit of privacy is valid, the complexity and efficacy of many "secure" communication solutions are questionable. The market has a lot of offerings that promise ‘military grade’ security, yet often fall short of providing truly secure environments. This leads to an unnecessary complication in the quest for privacy.

It's worth noting that most modern, top-of-the-line smartphones, especially iPhones, are quite secure by default. By limiting yourself to only the essential apps or usage and enabling features like lockdown mode, you can significantly limit the attack vectors. This baseline level of security also makes interception by authorities quite challenging under normal circumstances, maybe even closer to impossible.

In reality, executing an attack, such as intercepting messages, involves significant planning and targeting. It's not just about the technical capability but also about the cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of a potential threat actor. For instance, if a group of cybercriminals targets your crypto, the effort and resources they must invest are weighed against the potential gain. If the value, say 100k USD, doesn't justify their investment in the attack, the risk might be lower than perceived.

If you become valuable enough or are part of a network that's valuable enough to attract such attention, it's likely that there would already be sufficient data/proof to justify the use of more sophisticated (remote) digital forensic methods. This brings us back to the idea of keeping things in perspective and not getting carried away by an inflated sense of risk.

While I don't offer personal consultancy or services through this forum, I'm always up for discussion on these topics. Feel free to send me a message if you're interested in diving deeper into security and privacy matters.

 

[Cavaliere]

Most if not all SIM cards are traceable, they provide the operator with information about where you are, when you used your phone the last time with date & time stamp and from which location you made your last phone call.

What about secured phone, with encryption and what else they can do today, do they provide 100% privacy and are secure to use?

something like this
https://katim.com/

Google Pixel with GrapheneOS and everything over Tor is as pretty good with Briar, Cwtch or Tox (vulnerable) as communication apps. Many many many extra things you can do to make it more "secure" and "untraceable" as far as those things exist.

 

[Jerry1911]

Google Pixel with GrapheneOS and everything over Tor is as pretty good with Briar, Cwtch or Tox (vulnerable) as communication apps. Many many many extra things you can do to make it more "secure" and "untraceable" as far as those things exist.

This in combination with a prepaid SIM bought with cash will allow you to achieve what the NSA calls "near-total loss/lack of insight to target communications"... don't forget to set up GrapheneOS over a Tor hotspot as well

This is the best solution for geeks right now, for normies it's best to use an iPhone in lockdown mode with a prepaid SIM and a disposable email/fake name for Apple ID